Rep. Ed Case’s bills take aim at reforming Jones Act

Star-Advertiser

U.S. Rep. Ed Case of Hawaii said today he has reintroduced three bills in Congress to reform the Jones Act, which many critics say is responsible for artificially inflating the cost of shipping goods to the state.

“These three bills are meant to end a century of monopolistic closed market domestic cargo shipping to and from my isolated home state of Hawai‘i as well as the other island and separated jurisdictions of our country that lie outside the continental United States,” Case said. “The bills aim directly at one of the key drivers of our astronomically high cost of living in Hawai‘i and other similarly located jurisdictions.”

Case said because the Jones Act severely limits the supply of shipping to and from Hawaii’s communities, it has allowed a few companies to control the state’s lifeline to the outside world and, as a result, “command shipping rates way higher than the rest of the world.”

The 1920 Jones Act requires all cargo moved between two U.S. ports to be carried by vessels that are built in the country, owned by a U.S. entity and manned by an American crew.

Statement of Congressman Ed Case Before the Full U.S. House of Representatives Introducing Bills To Modernize The Jones Act

Madam Speaker, today I introduce three bills to end a century of monopolistic closed market domestic cargo shipping to and from my isolated home state of Hawai‘i as well as the other island and separated jurisdictions of our country not part of the continental United States. In doing so, we will break the stranglehold on the peoples and economies of these exposed communities and their resulting sky-high costs of living which results from just a few domestic shipping companies controlling the lifeline of commerce upon which we absolutely depend.

These bills all amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act. That federal law mandates that all cargo shipping between U.S. ports occur exclusively on U.S., not foreign, flagged vessels. Additionally, the law requires that these vessels are built in the U.S. and owned and crewed by U.S. citizens.

The Jones Act was enacted in a protectionist era under the guise of preserving a strong national merchant marine. But today it is just an anachronism: most of the world’s shipping is by way of an international merchant marine functioning in an open, competitive market. And those few U.S. flag cargo lines that remain have maneuvered the Jones Act to develop virtual monopolies over domestic cargo shipping to, from and within our most isolated and exposed locales – our island and offshore states and territories – that have no alternative modes of transportation such as trucking or rail.

My Hawai‘i is a classic example. Located almost 2,500 miles off the West Coast, we import well over 90 percent of our life necessities by ocean cargo. There are plenty of international cargo lines who could and would compete for a share of that market. Yet only two U.S. flag domestic cargo lines—Matson Navigation and Pasha Hawai‘i—operate a virtual duopoly over our lifeline.

While they are nominally subject to federal regulation, the fact of the matter is that cargo prices have gone in only one direction–up, fast and repeatedly, despite a surplus of international shipping–and it is indisputable that there is no downward market pressure which would otherwise result from meaningful competition. These accelerating cargo prices are not absorbed by the shipping lines, but passed through all the way down the chain, to the transporters, wholesalers, retailers, small businesses, mom-n-pops and ultimately consumers, of all of the elementals of life, from food to medical supplies, clothes, housing and virtually all other goods.

The result is a crippling drag on an already-challenged economy and the very quality of life in Hawai‘i.

The broadest, deepest effects of the Jones Act on Hawai‘i result from its impact on westbound imports from the continental United States to Hawai’i. But Hawai‘i is an export location as well, in key products such as agriculture and livestock. Here the Jones Act also effectively stifles meaningful competition in getting those products to their primary markets on the U.S. Mainland. Because the producers of these products and all that rely for their own livelihood on their successful export have to eat inflated shipping costs, these export industries, which any economist knows are the ultimate key to any economy’s prosperity, are also crippled.

Let’s take a concrete example: Hawaii’s once-prosperous ranching/cattle industry, which is so key to the economic health and the very lifestyle of so much of areas like the rural Big Island, where I was born and raised. That industry depends on getting its product, young cattle, to West Coast pens and transportation hubs in a cost-efficient manner. There are foreign cargo carriers that specialize, through custom cattle ships and overall sensitivity and adjustment to rancher timetables and needs, in such transport, but the Jones Act outright excludes them from the Hawai‘i-Mainland market. As a result, Hawaii’s ranchers are reduced to two crippling, cost magnifying options. The first is to ship their cargo by foreign carriers to Canada, where they have to go through a myriad of bureaucratic, cost-magnifying gyrations to get their product eventually to their U.S. markets. The second is to beg for the goodwill of the domestic carriers, to whom this is simply a hindrance rather than a major commitment, to ship directly to the West Coast.

And it shows: most of the cattle are first shipped from Hawaii’s Neighbor Islands, where the bulk of the cattle industry is located, to O‘ahu, in small “cow-tainers,” where they sit for days in Honolulu Harbor awaiting the return to the Mainland of one of the massive cargo ships designed and utilized for quite another purpose. The result (besides associated higher costs) is in-harbor cattle waste disposal challenges, higher in-transit cattle mortality and lower-weight cattle delivery to market. That’s what happens when you try to squeeze a square peg into a round hole.

More broadly, there is much evidence about the direct impact of the Jones Act on shipping prices to noncontiguous areas. At a basic level, the everyday goods that we rely on in Hawai‘i cost much more than on the Mainland, a difference which largely cannot be attributed to anything other than shipping costs.

Last year, the Grassroot Institute of Hawai‘i published a thorough and first-of-it-kind report, “Quantifying the Cost of the Jones Act to Hawai‘i.” The report found that:

  • The median annual cost of the Jones Act to the Hawai‘i economy is $1.2 billion.
  • The annual cost of shipping to Hawai‘i is estimated to be $654 million higher and prices $916 million higher.
  • The Jones Act annually costs each Hawai‘i resident more than $645. (3.
  • Thanks to the Jones Act, Hawai‘i has approximately 9,100 fewer jobs, representing $404 million in wages.
  • Hawai‘i families across all income groups would benefit from Jones Act reform. In the absence of Jones Act restrictions, those making between $15,000 and $70,000 annually would see an annual across-the-board economic benefit ranging from $78 million to $154 million.
  • Annual tax revenues would be $148.2 million higher.
  • Focusing solely on the Jones Act requirement that vessels be built in the United States, they found that the build provision results in a 1.2% shipping cost increase for Hawaii. This translates annually to an added cost of $531.7 million to the state’s economy, or about $296 per resident. It also means a loss of 3,860 jobs, and $30.8 million less in state and local tax revenues.

In 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York studied Puerto Rico’s economy and found that “the high cost of shipping is a substantial burden on the Island’s productivity.” The New York Fed found that, “[i]t costs an estimated $3,063 to ship a twenty-foot container of household and commercial goods from the East Coast of the United States to Puerto Rico; the same shipment costs $1,504 to nearby Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) and $1,687 to Kingston (Jamaica)—destinations that are not subject to Jones Act restrictions.” There is only one reason why costs are double to ship from the continental United States to a domestic port in Puerto Rico as compared to foreign ports in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica: there is international competition on the latter routes, none on the domestic route and the shipping companies take full advantage of that lack of competition.

The three bills I introduce today say: enough is enough. If you, the continental U.S., wants to continue the Jones Act as to shipping between your locations, that’s your business. But don’t penalize us island and other noncontiguous locations by throwing us to the monopoly wolves you’ve created.

The first bill, the Noncontiguous Shipping Relief Act, exempts all noncontiguous U.S. locations, including Hawai‘i, from the Jones Act. The second, the Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act, benchmarks the definition of a “reasonable rate” that Jones Act shipping can charge to within ten percent of analogous international shipping rates. And the third, the Noncontiguous Shipping Competition Act, prevents monopolies or duopolies in noncontiguous Jones Act shipping. Essentially, the bills are intended to lay out options for providing relief for our U.S. noncontiguous areas. We can resolve the issue in many ways, but we must change the status quo which has had such a deep, broad and negative impact on my state and the other jurisdictions beholden to the Jones Act.

The Noncontiguous Shipping Relief Act would allow the noncontiguous jurisdictions to be serviced by non-Jones Act vessels and increase, or in some cases create any, competition in these critical shipping lanes. Again, this is a small portion of the total national Jones Act shipping where it is particularly destructive in application.

Let me address directly the argument offered up by the domestic shippers in defense of the Jones Act: that it contains important labor and environmental protections that would be lost upon repeal. My bill would retain these important protections. Specifically, it provides that all foreign shippers operating under the bill’s Jones Act exemptions must comply with the same labor, environmental, tax, documentation, U.S. locus and other laws as are applicable to non-U.S. flag ships and shippers transiting U.S. waters today.

The Noncontiguous Shipping Reasonable Rate Act would define a “reasonable rate” for the noncontiguous domestic ocean trade as no more than ten percent above the rate set by a comparable international rate recognized by the Federal Maritime Commission. Currently, the Surface Transportation Board technically has the authority to adjudicate and set precedent on what a “reasonable rate” is for Jones Act shipping, but it has almost never been used and never to a clear conclusion on what is a reasonable rate. My bill would define reasonable to remove uncertainty. Current Jones Act shipping rates vary widely and there is no central compilation of these rates. The ten percent benchmark would allow for variance but also ensure that Americans in our noncontiguous areas are not forced to pay exorbitant rates way above shipping rates which would otherwise be provided through international competition were the Jones Act not applicable.

The Noncontiguous Shipping Competition Act would exempt shipping routes to noncontiguous jurisdictions from the Jones Act requirements if a monopoly or duopoly exists on those routes. The Jones Act has resulted in the blossoming of monopolies and duopolies in our noncontiguous jurisdictions. To ensure that these communities, which are the most reliant in the country on shipping to receive necessities, are not held hostage to these dominant companies, my bill would give Jones Act exemptions to routes that are not serviced by at least three companies with separate ownership. In short, if a domestic route is in fact in a competitive environment, the Jones Act is less of a problem, but if there is no competition, then the route should be opened up to international competition by rescinding the Jones Act.

Madam Speaker, these long-overdue bills are of the utmost importance to the localities which have long borne the unfair brunt of the Jones Act. It is often difficult to pierce the veil of longstanding custom and understanding to see the real negative impacts of a law and what should instead be. It is even more difficult to change a law which provides a federally created and endorsed monopoly under which no competition exists to hold down prices. Yet clearly the time for these measures is overdue. I urge their passage.

Ed Case
1st District, Hawai’i
2210 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, Dc 20515
Telephone: 202-225-2726
Fax: 202-225-0688

1132 Bishop Street,
Suite 1100
Honolulu, Hi 96813
Telephone: 808-650-6688
Fax: 808-533-0133
Website: Case.House.Gov

Committee On Appropriations
Subcommittees: Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
Legislative Branch Committee On Natural Resources
Subcommittees: National Parks, Forests and Public Lands Water, Oceans and Wildlife Indigenous Peoples Of The United States

Zim files papers to start 2021 with New York shipping IPO

TradeWinds
By Eric Martin –

Fundraiser could seek $100m as Israeli operator seeks access to public equity markets.

Zim Integrated Shipping Services has filed papers to launch an initial public offering in New York, in a bid to make good on long mooted plans to go public.

The Israeli containership operator aims to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange, where it will trade under ticker symbol ZIM, in a move that, if successful, would break a long absence of shipping IPOs on US capital markets.

The Haifa-based company did not give a timing for the IPO but pencilled in the aggregate value for the potential share sale at $100m.

Zim said that the main goal of the effort is to add to working capital and to create a public market for its shares, which would allow it to access equity markets in the future.

“We intend to use the net proceeds from this offering to support long-term growth initiatives, including investing in vessels, containers and other digital initiatives, to strengthen our capital structure, to foster financial flexibility and for general corporate purposes,” the outfit said in a draft prospectus.

The effort is backed by banks Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Barclays as global coordinators, with Jefferies and Clarksons Platou Securities on board as joint bookrunners for the offering, according to the document.

A listing in New York would make Zim the second container liner operator listed on US stock markets, alongside Hawaii’s Matson.

International profile

Unlike Matson, which owns its vessels and is mostly focused on protected US trades, Zim brings a mostly chartered-in fleet and a global profile. It is ranked as the 10th largest operator by aggregate fleet capacity.

Its unique profile relative to other US-listed shipping stocks could work to advantage.

“The market loves logistics and hates the shippers [shipping companies], most of which erroneously get lumped into the same bucket as tankers and correlate with energy,” said J Mintzmyer, lead researcher at Value Investor’s Edge.

“I think Zim has a good chance to help break this cycle by clearly pitching the global logistics business, plus the timing is perfect as we’re in the middle of the biggest containership boom in a decade.”

Eli Glickman-led Zim, which recorded a record profit in the third quarter amid booming box rates, had made no secret of its intentions to go public. The company was reportedly eyeing London and New York as potential locations for a listing, apparently choosing latter.

“We are a global, asset-light container liner shipping company with leadership positions in niche markets where we believe we have distinct competitive advantages that allow us to maximize our market position and profitability,” Zim said in the draft prospectus filed with the US Securities and exchange commission.

The company owns just one vessel, with its remaining 69 ships brought in through charter deals, the IPO papers show.

Zim operates 66 weekly lines serving 310 ports in 80 countries. The company, which carried 2.82m teu in cargo last year, has an aggregate fleet capacity of 359,000 teu.

The company’s largest shareholder is Idan Ofer’s Kenon Holdings, which holds a 32% slice. Deutsche Bank owns 16.7% of Zim’s shares, while Greek containership owner Danaos holds 10.2%.

Congress Overrides Trump’s Veto, Enacting Maritime Priorities in NDAA

MARITIME EXECUTIVE

The U.S. Senate voted Friday to override President Donald Trump’s veto of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2021, joining the House to continue an unbroken 60-year tradition of passing an annual military policy bill. In addition to servicemember pay, weapons procurement and other defense-related measures, the package contains countless legislative amendments on parallel matters – including high-priority questions for the American maritime industry, like financial relief for U.S. seaports, new rules for passenger vessel safety, and new language that applies federal offshore energy regulations (and the Jones Act) to offshore wind farms.

The NDAA contains language that ensures that offshore wind farms count as U.S. points for purposes of federal law, just like offshore oil and gas facilities. This provides certainty that foreign-flag vessels cannot be used to carry goods between U.S. ports and wind projects on the U.S. outer continental shelf.

According to the American Maritime Partnership, the NDAA also clarifies the terms and procedures that apply when an emergency administrative Jones Act waiver can be issued. In particular, a national defense waiver must be tied to a legitimate national defense need; non-defense waivers are now time-limited; and all waivers are subject to public reporting requirements whenever they are used.

“As we end this most challenging year, we are encouraged by Congress’s recognition of the contributions American Maritime makes to our security and to a healthy and resilient American economy,” said Michael Roberts, President of the American Maritime Partnership. “We are also grateful for the tangible progress made in this bill to reinforce the requirement that those who do work in our home waters must hire American workers and obey American laws. We look forward to building on that progress in the next Congress.”

The now-enacted law also creates a new Maritime Transportation System Emergency Relief Program (MTSERP) to provide funding to ports after natural disasters and emergencies, including the COVID-19 pandemic. It also raises the authorized funding level for the Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP) to $750 million annually, up from $500 million.

The NDAA also requires the Government Accountability Office to conduct an audit of federal agencies’ compliance with long-ignored cargo preference laws, which require government-owned and government-financed cargoes to ship aboard U.S.-flagged vessels. The audit will examine the degree of agency staff and contractor compliance, along with the past levels of enforcement effort by the Maritime Administration.

The NDAA also provides coastwise trade endorsements for three specific vessels that might not otherwise qualify. These include the St. Kitts-flagged cruise ship Safari Voyager; the formerly Russian-flagged expedition yacht Pacific Provider; and the Canadian-built tall ship Oliver Hazard Perry.

Creaking Jones Act Ships Turn to Chinese Shipyards for Maintenance Needs

Cato Institute
By Colin Grabow

Jones Act supporters, including the owners of ships operating in the domestic fleet, often claim the law is necessary to thwart China’s maritime ambitions. But it’s unclear how many of them actually believe such rhetoric. Despite professed concerns about China and the need to avoid foreign reliance for U.S. maritime needs, Jones Act shipping companies regularly make use of shipyards outside the United States for repairs, maintenance, and upgrades of their vessels. Including facilities in China.

No operator of Jones Act ships is a more enthusiastic patron of Chinese dry docks than shipping firm Matson, whose vessels have paid more than 50 visits to the state‐​owned COSCO (China Ocean and Shipping Company) shipyard in Nantong for needed work. Indeed, Matson has been such a loyal customer that COSCO hosted senior executives from the U.S. firm last year to celebrate the two companies’ 20‐​year relationship.

And Matson isn’t alone. A vessel owned by Jones Act shipping firm Pasha Hawaii, the Horizon Spirit, recently departed Nantong after nearly 50 days in a local shipyard, suggesting its stay was for more than a mere paint job.

According to maritime attorney Wayne Parker, who served for nearly eight years as in‐​house counsel to Matson and now‐​defunct Horizon Lines, “I never heard of any of our Jones Act‐​qualified container vessels being dry‐​docked, surveyed, or undergoing routine maintenance in U.S. shipyards. This was always done in foreign, usually mainland Chinese, shipyards.”

Although there is nothing objectionable about this from a free trade perspective, the irony and hypocrisy are inescapable. Both Matson and Pasha Hawaii have board of directors positions with the American Maritime Partnership, a leading Jones Act lobbying and advocacy group that frequently asserts the 100‐​year‐​old law serves as a bulwark against China. Yet these same Jones Act companies regularly send ships to the country to save on repair and maintenance costs.

Incredibly, the Jones Act actually helps keep Chinese repair yards humming. While ships plying the world’s oceans are typically scrapped at 15–20 years of age, Jones Act vessels—thanks to a U.S.-build requirement that dramatically raises the cost of buying new ships—are often kept in service until age 40 or beyond. An old fleet means more maintenance—and more business for Chinese shipyards.

Let’s review what’s going on here. By massively increasing vessel replacement costs through its U.S.-build mandate, the Jones Act promotes the use of older ships requiring more maintenance. Some of this maintenance is then hypocritically performed in Chinese state‐​owned shipyards, a portion of the cost savings from which is then spent on lobbying and advocacy work urging the Jones Act’s retention as a vital tool against China.

You can’t make this up.

Beyond the rankling hypocrisy, this use of Chinese shipyards further illustrates the gaping chasm between the Jones Act’s intended results and reality. The Jones Act has not fostered a vibrant domestic maritime industry or freed the United States from foreign reliance to meet its maritime needs. What it has produced is economic harm, a domestic fleet insufficient to meet U.S. national security needs, and shipyards so uncompetitive that vessels are dispatched to the far side of the Pacific Ocean for repair and maintenance.

This is a case study in the failure of protectionism, and one that should no longer be tolerated.

The Continuing Advance Of Automated and Autonomous Vessels

MONDAQ
By Lewis Brisbois –

In October 2019, San Francisco Marine & Energy Partner David Russo spoke at the BiLog Conference in La Spezia, Italy about the advent of autonomous and highly automated vessels. Beyond the numerous legal and technical issues raised by the advancement of this technology (discussed in this article), it was noted at the conference that this technology was accelerating. It was expected then that an extended Atlantic voyage would happen in 2020. That has now occurred.

In August 2020, the U.K. company Sea-Kit successfully operated its autonomous 12-meter vessel on a 22-day voyage mapping the ocean floor in the North Atlantic. The vessel was operated from the company’s shoreside office. This followed an earlier test crossing of the North Sea.

NYK Line has been on the forefront of this technology, having operated a 70,000-ton autonomous ship for a three-day voyage in September 2019. And earlier this year, it tested a manned but remote-operated tugboat in Tokyo Bay.

Perhaps the best sign of the significance of this developing technology was the U.S. Coast Guard’s recent action on this subject. In August 2020, the Coast Guard issued a public Request for Information to address the numerous issues raised by this technology. The Coast Guard solicited comment on matters including (1) the identification of current statutory or regulatory obstacles to the development and implementation of this technology, (2) recommendations for regulatory changes to advance the technology, (3) the benefits, costs, and risks of the technology, including impacts on the maritime workforce, safety, the environment, and cybersecurity, (4) necessary changes in training, and (5) infrastructure needs.

A variety of entities (e.g., IMO, BIMCO, American Bureau of Shipping) are already developing standards in this arena. How the Coast Guard will regulate this area remains to be seen in the years ahead. Interestingly, the Coast Guard was testing its own unmanned vessel for coastal waters surveillance in Hawaii at the time of this writing.

So, what are some of the legal implications of autonomous vessels? While we understand the concept of an unseaworthy ship with current technology, how will that change with smart ships and autonomous ships? Does every software glitch cause the vessel to be unseaworthy? What new standards will apply to define an unseaworthy ship? With the coming of the autonomous ship, we have to re-ask the questions, “What is the vessel owner’s duty of care? What will it mean to provide a reasonably safe ship when its operation is controlled by computer programs? Who will be considered the captain of the vessel? Will there be persons defined as seamen anymore, when those operating the ship are not exposed to the perils of the sea?” These are some of the questions that the courts and lawyers will have to address in the years ahead.